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ABSTRACT 
Activation of the default network (DN) during externally-directed cognitive control tasks has 
been associated with off-task behaviors and poor task performance. Recently, evidence has 
suggested that DN activation may be associated with better cognitive control when access to 
stored representational knowledge, a putative DN function,, is congruent with task goals (Spreng 
et al., 2014). Near-ceiling behavioral performance in this earlier study precluded analysis of 
incorrect trials. We address this limitation by increasing cognitive control demands. Healthy 
young adults (N=28) were scanned using fMRI while performing a working memory task. 
Famous and anonymous face stimuli were used to contrast high versus low access to stored 
representational knowledge, respectively. Differential DN activation was observed during correct 
and incorrect trials when famous faces were goal-relevant, or distractors. These results provide 
further evidence that the DN is not a ‘task negative’ network, but can support cognitive control 
when access to stored representations is goal-congruent.  
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Re-examining the Role of the Default Network During Controlled Processing 
The Default Network and Controlled Processing 
The default network (DN) is a collection of functionally-connected brain regions 
including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), lateral and 
medial temporal lobes (MTL), and the posterior inferior parietal lobules (IPL; Buckner, Krienen, 
Castellanos, Diaz & Yeo, 2008). The DN is active during internally-directed cognitive processes, 
such as self-generated thought and mentalizing, and is associated with attention to personally 
relevant stimuli, such as familiar faces (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood & Spreng, 2014; Leveroni 
et al., 2000). Activity within the DN is reduced during controlled processing and engagement of 
this network has been shown to disrupt externally-focused, goal-directed behaviour (Raichle et 
al., 2011; Shulman et al., 1997; Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007, but see: Spreng et al., 2014). 
For this reason, the DN has been described as a “task negative” network, associated with poor 
performance on externally-directed cognitive control tasks, off-task behaviours, and mind-
wandering. Indeed, reduced suppression of this network during cognitive control tasks is 
considered a marker of cognitive dysfunction (Anticevic et al., 2012; Christoff, Gordon, 
Smallwood, Smith & Schooler, 2009; Spreng, 2012; Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012).  While 
the DN is associated with internally-mediated processes, and poor task performance when 
engaged during externally-directed tasks, the dorsal attention network (DAN) is associated with 
positive task performance during tasks requiring externally-directed attention (Corbetta, Kincade 
& Shulman, 2002; Ptak and Schnider, 2010).  The DAN encompasses the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), frontal eye fields (FEF), inferior precentral sulcus (IPCS), intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS), middle temporal motion complex (MT), and superior parietal lobule (SPL; Corbetta et al., 
2002; Vossel, Geng & Fink, 2014). The dorsal attention and default networks are anti-correlated 
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both during both task and rest (Fox et al., 2005; Kelly, Udin, Biswal, Castellanos & Milham, 
2008; McKiernan, Kaufman, Kucera-Thompson & Binder, 2003). Tasks requiring external 
attention are associated with DAN activation and suppression of the DN (Buckner et al., 2008; 
Gusnard and Raichle, 2001) and internal processes are associated with DN activation (Andrews-
Hanna, Smallwood & Spreng, 2014). 
Research investigating the role of the DN in cognitive functioning is ongoing, with recent 
findings contradicting previous claims that DN activity disrupts performance on externally-
focused tasks (Anticevic et al., 2012; Mason et al., 2007; Weissman, Roberts, Visscher & 
Woldorff, 2006). These studies have provided preliminary evidence that the DN can facilitate 
controlled processing when the demands of the task are congruent with the functions of the DN 
(i.e., they depend on access to stored representation, or are personally relevant; Crittenden, 
Mitchell & Duncan, 2015; Konishi, McLaren, Engen, & Smallwood, 2005; Meyer, Spunt, 
Berkman & Taylor, 2002; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore & 
Schacter, 2010; Spreng et al., 2014). This suggests that the DN may not be a “task negative” 
network (Spreng, 2012), but rather, activation of the DN may facilitate goal-directed cognition 
when external task-demands are congruent with DN functions.  
The ability of the DN to facilitate controlled processing may also rely upon interactions 
among brain networks. During controlled processing of stimuli with personal relevance, DN 
regions increase functional connectivity with the frontoparietal-control network (FPCN; Spreng, 
Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore & Schacter, 2010; Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore & Schacter, 2011; 
St. Jacques, Kragel & Rubin, 2011), a network of regions associated with cognitive control 
functions, including conflict monitoring, reasoning, and planning (Kroger et al., 2002; van den 
Heuvel et al., 2003; Wager, Jonides & Reading, 2004). The FPCN encompasses the rostrolateral 
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prefrontal cortex (RLPFC), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), precuneus (PCu), anterior extent of the 
IPL, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and the anterior insula (aINS; Vincent et al., 2008; 
Spreng, et al., 2010). Spreng et al., (2010) used a common planning task to contrast DN activity 
when planning was externally-focused (i.e., Tower of London task; Shallice, 1982) or internally-
focused (i.e., autobiographical planning for one’s personal goals). The FPCN coupled with the 
DAN during the Tower of London task and with the DN during an autobiographical planning 
task that required access to internal representations to plan for future goals. The FPCN is 
anatomically interposed between the DAN and the DN, and may serve to flexibly couple with 
these networks to support cognitive performance, depending on task demands (i.e., externally- 
versus internally-focused tasks; Spreng et al., 2010). Indeed, specific nodes within the FPCN, 
such as the MFG, left aINS, dACC, and superior medial prefrontal cortex (sMPFC), demonstrate 
functional connectivity with the DN and DAN (Spreng, Sepulcre, Turner, Stevens & Schacter, 
2013). Spreng et al. (2013) suggest that activation of these dual-aligned nodes enables the FPCN 
to flexibly couple with either the DAN or DN and may serve as hubs for interactions among the 
three networks (i.e., FPCN, DN, & DAN) – shifting attentional focus from internal to externally 
directed processes. While studies have revealed specialised associations across different 
networks, such as the DN with internally-directed processes (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood & 
Spreng, 2014; Leveroni et al., 2000), and the dorsal attention network (DAN) with externally-
mediated processes (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al., 2002; Ptak and Schnider, 2010), 
inter-network connections, and interactions may be necessary to support complex cognition 
(McIntosh, 2000; Spreng, et al., 2013).  Cognitive control may depend upon inter-network 
coupling to support cognitive performance.  
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A recent study by Spreng et al., (2014) examined the role of the DN during an externally 
directed N-back working memory task. The N-back task is a visual working memory task 
associated with engagement of frontal and parietal cortices (Jonides et al., 1993; Owen, 
McMillan, Laird & Bullmore, 2005). The authors manipulated access to stored representational 
knowledge during working memory by incorporating DN congruent (famous faces) and DN 
incongruent (anonymous faces) stimuli (Spreng et al., 2014). Famous faces initiate access to 
stored representations (e.g., name, occupation, movie roles) and have been shown to reliably 
activate regions of the DN (Gobbini and Haxby, 2007). Previous studies demonstrating that DN 
activity during an externally-directed controlled processing task is associated with poor task 
performance have used stimuli that are devoid of personal meaning, such as shapes or blocks 
(Weissman et al., 2006).  In the Spreng et al. (2014) study, personally meaningful stimuli (i.e., 
famous faces) were used to investigate whether activation of the DN could support externally 
directed controlled processing (i.e., working memory). Indeed, this was the case. Famous face 
working memory trials, in contrast to anonymous face trials, were associated with activity within 
the DN. Further, accuracy for famous face working memory was higher than anonymous face 
trials, suggesting that activation within the DN may facilitate task performance under DN-
congruent conditions.  In contrast to famous faces, anonymous face matches engaged frontal and 
parietal brain regions associated with external attention. Meyer and colleagues (2012) also 
demonstrated that DN activation was associated with enhanced performance on a social working 
memory task which required maintenance and online manipulation of social information. 
Participants were required to rank order friends based on a given trait, and working memory load 
was defined as the number of friends to be ranked on a given trial. Social working memory load 
was associated with parametric increases in activity in frontoparietal and DN regions. Taken 
                           5 
 
together, these results suggest that the DN can facilitate performance during an externally-
directed task, but only when stimuli activate internal representations.   
Other reports have postulated a role for the DN during externally-directed, controlled 
processing tasks. A recent study by Konishi et al., (2015) demonstrated that the DN is active 
during cognitive control when stimuli to be processed are not accessible to perceptual processing 
and must rely on mnemonic processes. The DN has also been implicated in task switching, a 
specific cognitive control function necessary to reorient processing resources from external 
perceptual processing to perform internally-directed tasks such as retrieving items from memory, 
engaging in creative or imaginative thought, or considering the perspective of others (i.e., theory 
of mind; Crittenden et al., 2015). This reorienting or shifting of task context has also been 
associated with interactions among large-scale brain networks, including the DN (Spreng et al., 
2013). 
Once thought to disrupt performance during cognitive processing (Anticevic et al., 2012; 
Mason et al., 2007; Weissman et al., 2006), recent studies have elucidated the role of the DN 
during the processing of familiar stimuli (Leveroni et al., 2000), social and traditional working 
memory tasks (Konishi et al., 2015; Meyer et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2014), problem-solving 
(Spreng et al., 2010), and task switching (Crittenden et al., 2015). Taken together these studies 
challenge the characterization of the DN as a ‘task negative’ network and posit a more active role 
for these brain regions in cognitive control. Both stimulus properties and cognitive context 
appear to play a role (Meyer et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2010; Spreng et al., 2014). The DN can 
facilitate controlled processing when stimuli have personal meaning (Meyer et al., 2012; Spreng 
et al., 2014) or when cognitive task demands are personally relevant (Spreng et al., 2010). The 
engagement of the DN during controlled processing may also be mediated by inter-network 
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interactions, specifically the FPCN coupling with the DN (Spreng et al., 2010; Spreng et al., 
2013).  
Default Network Subsystems 
The DN can be structurally and functionally divided into three subsystems, each serving 
differing, and overlapping, processes: the medial temporal subsystem, the dorsomedial 
subsystem, and the core subsystem (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Pulin & Buckner, 2010).  
Medial temporal subsystem. The medial temporal subsystem is comprised of the 
hippocampus (HC), parahippocampal gyrus (PHG), the retrosplenial cortex (RSC), the posterior 
IPL and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). This subsystem is supported by white 
matter tracts connecting the MTL, RSC, and angular gyrus (AG; Schmahmann, Pandya, Wang, 
et al., 2007;Kobayashi, & Amaral,2003). The medial temporal subsystem is recognized to have a 
role in mental simulation, imagination, and memory (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Bar et al., 2007; 
Buckner et al., 2008; Hassabis & Maquire 2007; Schacter et al., 2012). Specifically, this system 
is associated with episodic recollection, contextual retrieval, and simulating the future. It is 
reliably activated during tasks that require participants to view objects with strong contextual 
associations and use associative conceptual knowledge to guide decision making (Bar, 2007; 
Kumaran, Summerfield, Hassabis & Maquire 2007).  This system works in tandem with the 
dorsal medial subsystem when access to past internal representations are required (e.g., 
mentalizing about the future requires knowledge of people within the mentalized situation; 
Rabin, Gilboa, Stuss, Mar & Rosenbaum, 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010).  The core role of this 
sub system is to update, and track, knowledge that is not within the immediate perceptual 
environment.  
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Dorsal medial subsystem. The dorsal medial subsystem is comprised of the dorsal 
medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the lateral temporal 
cortex, and the temporal pole. This subsystem is supported by connections between the inferior 
parietal lobe and lateral temporal lobe via the middle longitudinal fasciculus. This subsystem is 
heavily involved in mentalizing, the process in which we attend to the mental states of ourselves, 
and others around us (Frith & Frith, 2003; Liebeman 2007; Mar, 2011; Saxe, 2006; Schilbach, 
Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink & Vogeley, 2008). It has been suggested that this subsystem 
contributes to social cognition by allowing individuals to access, and use, social conceptual 
knowledge to reflect on the thought processes of oneself and others. The dmPFC has been 
associated with social-processing tasks such as discriminating between representations of 
individuals (Hassabis et al., 2014). The right TPJ has been associated with reflecting on the 
beliefs of other people (Saxe, 2011). The inferior frontal and lateral temporal regions have been 
associated with social tasks that involve the semantic/conceptual aspect of mentalizing (Binder & 
Desai, 2011; Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Seghier, 2013).  This subsystem typically 
couples with the DLPFC when social tasks require executive control (Liberman, 2007). For 
example, Meyer et al. (2012) found that, during a social working memory task, working memory 
load was associated with parametric increases in default network, and DLPFC activity. Taken 
together, there is evidence to suggest that, overall, this subsystem is involved in social cognitive 
processes, with contributions from each brain region.  
Core subsystem. The core system of the default network is comprised of the anterior 
medial prefrontal cortex (amPFC) and the PCC. This system is supported by connections 
between the PCC and amPFC via the cingulum bundle. The PCC is considered a key node in the 
DN and reliably activates across all tasks that require self-generated thought and is suggested to 
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be an important zone of integration within the DN (e.g., episodic/autobiographical memory, 
future thinking, mentalizing, spatial navigation; Binder et al., 2009; Brewer, Garrison, & 
Whitfield-Gabrieli, 2013; Qin & Northoff, 2011). The dorsal region of the PCC has been 
associated with monitoring socially behaviourally relevant stimuli and environmental changes 
(Leech, Kamourieh, Beckmann & Sharp, 2011; Pearson, Heilbronner, Barack, Hayden & Platt, 
2011). Other important zones of integration of the DN, that reliably activate across nearly all 
self-generated thought tasks, include the anterior lateral temporal cortex and the AG (Mar, 2011; 
Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012). It has been suggested that the AG may serve as a cross-modal hub 
allowing internal and external representations to interact (Binder & Desai, 2011; Seghier, 2013). 
The amPFC is most associated with self-related processing (e.g., when individuals reference 
information to themselves or access personal knowledge; Andrews-Hanna, 2012; D’Argembeau, 
2013). This area also becomes active when individuals make value decisions pertaining to 
personally significant others (Benoit, Gilbert, Volle, & Burgess, 2010; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 
2010).  The amPFC has extensive connections with both the dorsal medial subsystem, and the 
medial temporal subsystem (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). Overall, the core system is best 
thought of as a zone of integration that allows interaction amongst the other two subsystems.  
Familiar Face Processing Network 
Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini (2000) suggest that the human neural system supporting face 
perception consists of two subsystems: the core system, and the extended system.  The core 
subsystem is associated with brain regions sub-serving distinct perceptual functions: the inferior 
occipital gyri (IOG), associated with the early perception of facial features, the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), associated with the recognition of expression, and the lateral fusiform gyrus (FG), 
associated with the recognition of unique facial identity. The early perception of facial features is 
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necessary for processing the recognition of expression and identity. Recognition of identity relies 
on static properties of faces, such as unique facial structure. In contrast, recognition of 
expression relies on dynamic properties, such as gaze or facial expression (Haxby et al., 2000).  
Behaviourally, recognition of identity and expression are dissociable - familiarity, and repetition 
priming, facilitate performance on facial identity, but not expression, matching tasks (Ellis, 
Young & Flude, 1990; Young et al., 1986). In contrast to the core subsystem, the extended 
subsystem is associated with a set of brain regions implicated in processing the social properties 
of faces: the intraparietal sulcus with identification of direction of gaze, the auditory cortex with 
pre-lexical speech perception (i.e., lip reading), the limbic system with processing of emotional 
expression, and the anterior temporal cortex with retrieval of autobiographical information 
(Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore & McCarthy, 1998; George et al., 1999; 
Haxby et al., 2000; Sergent, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992; Streit et al., 1999).  These two 
subsystems serve distinct functions. Facial perception begins in the core subsystem, which 
engages perceptual information, followed by further processing in the extended subsystem, 
which identifies socially relevant information.  
While all facial perception engages the core subsystem, the familiarity of a face impacts 
the engagement of the extended system. In contrast to unfamiliar faces, viewing familiar faces 
(e.g., a famous face) engages a person-knowledge extended system. The person-knowledge 
extended system encompasses brain regions associated with theory of mind, semantic and 
episodic retrieval, and emotion (i.e., the amygdala, anterior paracingulate, anterior and medial 
temporal cortex, posterior STS, & PCC; Gobbini, Leibenluft, Santidago & Haxby, 2004; 
Leveroni et al., 2000). Engagement of the person-knowledge subsystem may represent inter-
connected representations affiliated with our knowledge of a familiar face.  These rich neural 
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representations can enhance visual encoding (Bruce & Young, 1986; Balas, Cox, & Conwell, 
2007). Indeed, greater familiarity of a face facilitates performance on recognition tasks (Jackson 
& Raymond, 2008). In contrast, recognition of unfamiliar faces is easily disrupted by changes in 
viewpoint (Bruce et al., 1999; Hill, Schyns, & Akamatsu, 1997), poor lighting (Hill & Bruce, 
1996; Johnston, Hill, & Carman, 1992) and image/video quality (Burton, Wilson, Cowan, & 
Bruce 1999). While facial perception begins in the core system, processing in the extended 
system is modulated by familiarity. Engagement of the person knowledge extended system is 
isolated to the processing of familiarity, suggesting a unique face neural network for familiar 
faces.   
Memory Systems: Recollection and Familiarity 
Dual process theories suggest that recognition memory consists of two distinct processes: 
recollection, and familiarity (Jacoby, 1991; Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Mandler, 1980; Reder et 
al., 2000; Yonelinas, 1994, 2002). Recollection refers to the recovery of qualitative information 
about a specific event. For example, recalling the identity of a person, and the context in which 
you first encountered them. Familiarity is the subjective feeling of recognizing an event, without 
remembering specific details. For example, knowing that you have met someone before, without 
remembering specific details regarding your first encounter. There is evidence to suggest that 
recollection and familiarity are dissociable processes. Suggesting processing speed is increased 
when engaging familiar, versus recollective processes, individuals are significantly faster when 
discriminating events based on familiarity, rather than the contextual details (Hintzman & 
Caulton, 1997; Gronlund, Edwards, & Ohrt, 1997; Hintzman, Caulton, & Levin, 1998). During 
recognition tests, distinct receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) are observed when plotting 
hit rates against false alarm rates. Familiarity is associated with a curvilinear function, whereas 
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recollection is associated with a linear function (Kelley & Wixted, 2001; Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, 
& Adams, 1999; Yonelinas, 1994, 1999; Yonelinas, Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King, 
1996). Familiarity and recollection evoke distinct event-related potentials (ERPs), suggesting 
engagement of separate brain processes (Curran, 2000;   Düzel,Yonelinas,  Mangun,  Heinze,  & 
Tulving,  1997; Smith,  1993;  Klimesch,  Doppelmayr,  Yoneli-nas,  Kroll,  Lazzara,  Rohm,  &  
Gruber,  2001). Further, brain injuries result in differing impairments on familiarity and 
recollection processes. For example, recollection is disproportionately impaired in amnesic 
patients (Aggleton & Shaw, 1996; Aggleton et al., 2000; Carlesimo, 1994). Indeed, theoretical, 
neural, and behavioural research support recollection and familiarity as two dissociable cognitive 
processes involved in recognition memory.  
Neural systems. Neuroimaging studies on recognition memory suggests that recollection 
and familiarity are supported by engagement of the medial temporal and frontal lobes (Yonelina, 
2002). In the medial temporal lobe, the hippocampal region is critical for recollection, whereas 
the surrounding structures in the medial and inferior temporal lobe are associated with familiarity 
processes (e.g., the parahippocampal cortex; Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Eichenbaum, Otto, & 
Cohen, 1993). Indeed, damage severing the HC from surrounding structures primarily disrupts 
the associative elements of recollection, whereas extensive MTL damage impairs both 
recollective and familiarity processes (Gilboa et al., 2006). Analysis of neural activation patterns 
associated with recognition memory elucidate recollection and familiarity processes 
differentially engaging MTL regions (Skinner & Fernandes, 2007). Recollection has been 
associated with increased activation in the PHG and HC, whereas familiarity is associated with 
decreased activation in the right HC. Engagement of MTL regions during recollective and 
familiarity processes is typically associated with memory storage (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; 
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Aggleton & Brown, 1999). Whereas the MTL is implicated in memory storage, the frontal lobe 
is implicated in the retrieval of semantic and episodic memory (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998). 
Episodic memory gives rise to the conscious experience of “remembering” (i.e., recollection), 
and semantic memory gives rise to the conscious experience of “knowing” (i.e., the feeling of 
familiarity; Tulving, 1985; Yonelina, 2002). A recent meta-analysis suggests that familiarity and 
recollection are associated with differentiated, and overlapping activation patterns within the 
frontal lobes. While both recollection and familiarity processes activate the right DLPFC, 
recollection is associated with additional activity in the bilateral anterior, and superior, frontal 
lobes (Skinner & Fernandes, 2007). Dissociable neural correlates suggests process-dependent 
activation within medial temporal and frontal lobe regions during familiarity and recollection 
processes (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Skinner & Fernandes, 2007; Yonelina, 2002). The medial 
temporal lobes are implicated in memory storage (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Aggleton & 
Brown, 1999) and retrieval processes engage the frontal lobes (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998).  
Current Study 
Study rationale and research aims 
Activation of the DN during externally-directed controlled processing has been 
associated with off-task behaviour and poor task performance (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood & 
Spreng, 2014). However, previous studies have typically used stimuli that do not require an 
internal focus or access to stored internal representations (Weissman et al., 2006).  It follows 
then, that activation of the DN in these studies has been associated with off-task behaviour. A 
study by Spreng et al. (2014) provided preliminary evidence that activation of the DN is 
associated with successful performance during an externally-directed controlled processing task 
when stimuli (famous faces) engage stored representational knowledge. This suggests that the 
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DN may not be a “task negative” network, but, rather, may facilitate performance under DN-
congruent conditions. However, performance on the previous task was near ceiling, precluding 
investigation of the association between DN activity and task performance. Here we use a more 
challenging 3-back faces task to directly examine the impact of DN activity on performance by 
examining correct and incorrect trials separately. The overall aim of the study is to extend 
previous work by Spreng and colleagues (2014) to directly investigate the contribution of DN 
activity to externally-directed cognitive control. 
Hypotheses 
We investigate whether default network activity will facilitate controlled processing 
under conditions that require access to stored representations. We hypothesize that when access 
to stored representations can be used to support cognitive control (e.g., famous faces that serve as 
targets), DN activity will be associated with better task performance. In contrast, when access to 
stored representations is not goal-relevant (i.e. distracting), default network activity will be 
associated with off task behavior and poor task performance.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Twenty-eight healthy, young adult participants (18-35 years of age) were recruited from 
the undergraduate research pool at Cornell University. All participants were healthy, with normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed consent was obtained, and the experiment was 
conducted in accordance with the York University Office of Research Ethics and the Institutional 
Ethics Review Board at Cornell University. Three participants were excluded. One due to an 
fMRI artefact, one because of a response box malfunction, and a third because of poor famous 
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face recognition (< 10 famous faces recognized). After exclusions, 25 participants remained 
(Mage = 21; 64% female). 
Study Design 
 Participants completed a practice session of a working memory task, and then underwent 
MRI scanning while completing eight runs of a working memory task. After scanning, 
participants completed a recognition task for the face stimuli from the working memory task, 
where they were asked to judge the ‘famousness’ of each image.   
Tasks 
Practice task. This task consisted of a series of screens explaining the working memory 
task rules (see below). Participants were required to complete practice blocks of each task 
condition.  The first two blocks of the practice task were non-timed 1-back and 3-back blocks 
(see N-back task). During the first two blocks, stimuli were presented for an unlimited time 
period (i.e., stimuli did not cycle without a participant response). Afterwards, participants were 
required to complete four blocks of a 1-back, and 3-back task (approximately 15 minutes; see 
below for stimuli presentation details). Within each block was one 1-back, and one 3-back task. 
Participants did not proceed until they had reached 80% accuracy on the 1-back, and 60% on the 
3-back task or had failed the practice task three times.  
N-back task. This task consisted of 1-back, 3-back, and rest blocks, across eight runs. 
Within each run was one 1-back, three 3-back, and four rest blocks. For the 1-back condition, 
participants were required to press a button when the face they saw was the same face presented 
one image before, and press another button when the face they saw was not the same face 
presented one image before. For the 3-back portion, participants were required to press a button 
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when the face they saw was the same face presented three images before, and press another 
button when the face they saw was not the same face presented three images before. For our rest 
condition, between working memory blocks, participants were presented with a fixation cross for 
14 seconds. The task was approximately one hour (i.e., seven minutes per run).  Each run 
consisted of 152 non-repeating faces (114 anonymous and 38 famous faces). Each face was 
presented for 750 ms, followed by a 1250 ms fixation cross. Conditions of interest for the 1-back 
were anonymous-anonymous faces (AA; n = 64) and famous-famous faces (FF; n = 40) pairs. 
Conditions of interest for the 3-back were anonymous-famous-famous-anonymous faces (AFFA 
n = 72), and famous-anonymous-anonymous-famous faces (FAAF n = 72), quadruplets. These 
quadruplets were chosen as they are balanced for stimuli (i.e., famous and anonymous faces). 
Each pair and quadruplet was separated by an anonymous face (see Figure 1). 
Recognition task. This task consisted of 304 famous and 480 anonymous faces from the 
working memory task.  Participants were shown each face and asked to decide if the face was 
famous, or not famous. The purpose of this task was to exclude unrecognized famous faces from 
the n-back famous face trials.  
Stimuli 
 Images of famous faces were gathered via google images. Images of anonymous faces 
were gathered via open-source model databases. Face stimuli were edited using Photoshop.  
First, images were grey-scaled and cropped using oval selection. Background around face stimuli 
were removed. Last, brightness was adjusted to similar levels across all images. 
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Data Analysis 
 MRI data collection and preprocessing. Brain imaging data were acquired with a 3T 
GE Discovery MR750 MRI scanner (GE Healthcare, Milwaukee, WI) with a 32-channel receive-
only phased array head coil at the Cornell Magnetic Resonance Imaging Facility, in Ithaca. 
Anatomical scans were acquired using a T1-weighted volumetric MRI Magnetization Prepared 
Rapid Gradient Echo (MP-RAGE; TR = 7.7ms; TE = 3.4ms; 7 flip angle; 1.0mm isotropic 
voxels, 176 slices). Eight 7m 18s experimental runs of blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) 
functional scans were acquired with a T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) pulse sequence 
(TR = 2000 ms; TE = 25 ms; 80 flip angle; 49 axial slices; 3.0 mm isotropic voxels).  
Anatomical data were skull stripped and segmented using Freesurfer. All fMRI data were 
processed using AFNI (Cox, 1996). The first four volumes from each run were excluded to allow 
for T1-equilibration effects. All functional data underwent slice-timing correction, despiking, 
motion correction, and white matter, ventricle, and drainage vessel regression. Functional data 
were then co-registered with their skull-stripped anatomical image, and aligned to Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space. Lastly, functional data were smoothed using a 6 mm full 
half-width at half maximum kernel (FWHM).  
 Partial least squares. One of the statistical techniques that was used to analyze 
neuroimaging data was Partial Least Squares (PLS). This method of analysis is a data-driven 
multivariate statistical technique that reveals patterns of activity that are associated with each 
condition of our study design (PLS; Krishnan et al., 2011; McIntosh et al., 1996). For analysis of 
the n-back task we inputted working memory and rest blocks as conditions of interest. Each 
participant had 32 working memory blocks, using a block length of 44 seconds, and 32 rest 
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blocks, using a block length of 14 seconds. For our famous and anonymous face analysis, the 
first instance of viewing an anonymous and famous face were compared. Because participants 
viewed more anonymous, than famous faces, anonymous faces were randomly chosen until they 
matched the number of famous faces for each participant. Famous faces and anonymous faces 
were inputted as conditions of interest, and a trial block time of two seconds was used. For the 
analysis of our 1-back task, our conditions of interest, FF and AA, were inputted using a trial 
block time of four seconds. For the analysis of our 3-back task, our conditions of interest, FAAF 
and AFFA, were inputted using a trial block time of eight seconds.  The results of this analysis 
reveal latent variables (LVs) that are associated with patterns of brain activity that differentiate 
conditions of interest. Each voxel is given a singular value weight for each LV, known as 
salience, which is proportional to the covariance of activity with the task contrast on a given LV. 
Composite brain activity scores for each participant, on each LV, are calculated by multiplying 
the salience by the BOLD signal value in a given voxel, and calculating the mean across all 
voxels. Brain scores are then used to examine similarities and differences in brain activity across 
conditions of interest. Greater activity in brain areas with positive, or negative, weights on an LV 
will yield positive, or negative, mean scores for each condition across participants. To determine 
differences in activity across conditions, confidence intervals (95%) for the mean composite 
brain activity score in each condition are calculated from bootstrap. Significant differences are 
determined by lack of overlap between confidence intervals. This method of analysis is able to 
avoid the problem of multiple statistical comparisons because the decomposition and associated 
resampling techniques consider all voxels simultaneously. This technique is able to identify 
voxels with co-varying activity, making it methodologically suitable for the investigation of 
large-scale brain networks. Significance of LVs were determined by 500 permutation tests, using 
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resampling without replacement.  The significance of each voxel’s contribution to a LV was 
provided by bootstrapping the resampled data 500 times, with replacement, to estimate the SE of 
the salience of each voxel on the LV. A bootstrap ratio (BSR), calculated as the ratio of each 
salience to its SE, was thresholded at ±2.58 (equivalent to p < 0.01). A cluster size of 20 voxels 
was used, removing any activation/deactivation less than 20 voxels from each LV.   
Analyses 
 Recognition task. For each participant, a trial was excluded if they did not recognize one 
or more famous faces. For example, if a participant did not recognize the first famous face of a 
FAAF trials, the trial was excluded. After exclusion, the number of trials included in each 
analysis were: 1-back correct (FF, M = 28, SD = 7) and 3-back correct (AFFA, M = 24, SD = 13; 
FAAF, M = 32, SD = 12) and incorrect conditions (AFFA, M = 13, SD = 5; FAAF, M = 11.32, 
SD = 5). 
N-back task. Using PLS, baseline rest activity and n-back task activity were inputted as 
conditions of interest. This analysis was conducted to validate the faces n-back task via 
activation of brain regions associated with working memory (i.e., bilateral parietal cortex, aINS, 
dACC and the bilateral FG (FG; Spreng et al., 2014). 
Anonymous and famous faces. The first instances of famous and anonymous faces were 
analyzed using PLS. For our analysis, anonymous faces were randomly chosen until they 
matched the number of famous faces for each participant. This analysis was conducted to 
determine if the famous and anonymous faces were eliciting neural activity in accordance with 
previous studies. Famous faces engage more regions of the DN, such as the MPFC, medial and 
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lateral temporal lobes and PCC, whereas anonymous faces engage more FPCN and DAN 
regions, such as the superior parietal cortex (Leveroni et al., 2000; Spreng et al., 2014). 
Specific Hypotheses 
(i)  We hypothesized that performance would be higher when famous faces served as targets. To 
investigate whether performance would be better for famous versus anonymous face matches, 
univariate statistics were used to identify the main effect of stimulus type (famous and 
anonymous) and working memory condition (1-back & 3-back). We then used a priori paired 
sample t-tests to identify differences in accuracy and reaction time amongst our 1-back (FF & 
AA) and 3-back (AFFA & FAAF) conditions of interest.  
(ii) We hypothesized that when famous faces served as targets, DN activity would be associated 
with correct trial performance. To investigate whether DN activity would be greater during 
working memory for famous versus anonymous faces, we used multivariate analyses (PLS) to 
identify whole-brain patterns of activity for famous versus anonymous face match correct trials: 
FF vs. AA (1-back); FAAF vs. AFFA (3-back).   
(iii) We hypothesized that when famous faces served as targets, DN activity would be associated 
with correct trials performance. When hypothesized that when anonymous faces served as 
targets, misses would be associated with DN activity. To investigate whether default network 
activity during the working memory task was associated with task performance, we used PLS 
analyses to contrast hits versus misses during the famous and anonymous 3-back working 
memory trials (i.e. FAAF and AFFA).  
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Results 
Behavioral 
Accuracy. We defined accuracy as number of hits in proportion to misses. An analysis of 
variance was conducted using fame and working memory as factors. For fame, AA and AFFA 
were combined as one factor level, and FF and FAAF as another. For working memory, 1-back 
and 3-back conditions were used as factor levels.  Significant effects for fame (F(1, 24) = 27.13, 
p < .001,  2 = 0.53) and working memory (F(1, 24) = 200.16, p = < .001,  2 = 0.89) were 
observed. There was no significant interaction between working memory and fame. Planned 
comparisons revealed that working memory was better for fame target trials, AA (M = 87.81, SD 
= 7.52) vs. FF (M = 93.90, SD = 4.63), t (24) = 4.83, p < .001); AFFA (M = 64.91, SD =10.48) 
vs. FAAF (M = 71.57, SD = 10.981, t(24) = -3.05, p = .005).  
Reaction time. An analysis of variance was conducted using fame and working memory 
as factors. For fame, AA and AFFA were combined as one factor level, and FF and FAAF as 
another. For working memory, 1-back and 3-back conditions were used as factor levels. 
Significant effects for fame (F(1, 24) = 11.56, p = .002,  2 = 0.33 ) and working memory were 
observed (F(1, 24) = 71.04, p = < .001,  2 = 0.75). There was no significant interaction between 
working memory and fame. Planned comparisons revealed that reaction time was not 
significantly faster for fame target trials during the 1-back task, AA (M = 546.03, SD = 81.75) 
vs. FF (M = 537.28, SD = 85.74), t (24) = -1.47, p = .155), but was significantly faster for fame 
target trials during the 3-back task, AFFA (M = 625.05, SD = 96.89) vs. FAAF  (M = 602.50, SD 
= 94.13, t(24) = 3.97, p < .001).  
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Functional Neuroimaging 
We conducted preliminary analyses to assess the main effects of our primary task 
manipulations: (1) working memory vs. rest and (2) famous versus anonymous working memory 
conditions. A contrast of working memory versus rest conditions (collapsed across 1- and 3-back 
conditions) revealed a significant latent variable dissociating activity between the two conditions 
(p < .001). Consistent with previous work (Spreng et al., 2014), working memory was associated 
with activity in the bilateral prefrontal and parietal brain regions, dACC and bilateral fusiform 
gyrus. Regions associated with the rest condition included: PCC, MPFC and IPL (see Table 1 
and Figure 3). Next, we analyzed patterns of brain response that differentiated viewing the first 
instance of a famous versus an anonymous face.  The contrast revealed a significant latent 
variable (p = .004). Viewing famous faces was associated with activity in orbitofrontal prefrontal 
cortex (OPFC), vmPFC, DLPFC, anterior prefrontal cortex, SPL, posterior IPL, portions of the 
anterior and lateral temporal lobes, PCC and visual associative areas. Viewing anonymous faces 
was associated with activity in DLPFC, dACC, insula, anterior portion of the IPL, SPL, portions 
of the lateral temporal lobes, TPJ, PCu, MT, and visual association areas (see Table 2 and Figure 
3).  
 We hypothesized that DN activity would be associated with better working memory 
performance during the famous face target trials as these stimuli should activate stored 
associations that would support task performance. For our 1-back condition, multivariate 
analysis revealed a pattern of brain activity dissociating FF and AA hits (p < .002). For the FF 
condition, regions included the MPFC, PCC, posterior IPL, TPJ, PHG, HC, dACC and insula. 
For the AA condition, regions included the PCC,  lateral temporal lobes, FEF, DLPFC, TPJ, 
MFG, anterior IPL and anterior PFC (see Table 3 and Figure 5). For the 3-back working memory 
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conditions, FAAF and AFFA were dissociated (p = .038). FAAF hits were associated with 
activity in VMPFC, lateral & medial temporal lobes, dACC, MFG, RLPFC, DLPFC, IPCS, MT 
and bilateral FG. AFFA hits regions included the MFG, insula & SPL (see Table 4 and Figure 6).  
We postulated that errors might be caused by a failure of the FPCN to couple with the 
appropriate network (i.e., the DAN for anonymous faces, and the DN for famous faces; Spreng et 
al., 2013). To address this question we first analyzed each stimulus condition separately. 
Contrasting FAAF hits versus misses revealed a significant LV (p < .001). Famous face hits were 
associated with activity in dorsal PCC, lateral temporal lobes, HC, insula, dACC, DLPFC, TPJ, 
bilateral intraparietal sulcus (IPS), bilateral SPL and bilateral FG. Famous face misses were 
associated with activity in the PHG, PCC, MPFC, MFG, anterior IPL, SFG, and left FG (see 
Table 5 and Figure 7). AFFA hits versus misses also revealed a significant LV (p = .046). 
Anonymous face hits were associated with activity in the MFG, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
aINS, IPL, DLPFC, FEF, IPS, & right FG. Anonymous face misses were associated with activity 
in the lateral temporal lobe, AG, PCu, SPL & MT (see Table 6 and Figure 7). Next, we directly 
contrasted 3-back famous and anonymous misses. Our analysis revealed a significant pattern of 
activity dissociating FAAF and AFFA miss conditions (p = .002). Activity associated with 
famous face misses included the MPFC, posterior IPL, PCC, MFG, FEF & anterior IPL. For 
anonymous face misses, activity was observed in  the HC, lateral temporal lobes, PCC, ACC, 
anterior IPL, PCu & left FG (see Table 7 and Figure 6). 
Discussion  
 Default network activity has been associated with mind wandering, and poor performance 
on cognitive control tasks (Weissman et al., 2006; Mason et al., 2007). Previous studies 
investigating the role of the DN during cognitive control tasks have typically used stimuli that 
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are devoid of personal meaning. When stimuli can access stored representations (e.g., familiar 
faces), they reliably engage the DN (Leveroni et al., 2000). Spreng et al., (2014) provided 
preliminary evidence suggesting the activation of the DN during cognitive control can facilitate 
access to goal-congruent stored representational knowledge. In this earlier study, near-ceiling 
behavioural performance limited analysis of DN activity and connectivity to correct trials. In the 
current study, we directly addressed this limitation. Specifically, we increased working memory 
demands to investigate how DN activity was associated with cognitive control performance 
when access to representational knowledge was goal-relevant or irrelevant. The inclusion of this 
more demanding cognitive control condition facilitated analysis of correct and incorrect trials, 
allowing us to directly examine how the DN activity is associated with cognitive control 
performance. Consistent with previous findings, working memory engaged regions of both the 
DAN and FPCN, while viewing famous relative to anonymous faces primarily engaged DN 
regions (see Tables 1-2; Spreng et al., 2014). Critically, activation of the DN, particularly the 
medial temporal lobe subsystem, was differentially associated with task performance based on 
the goal relevance of stored representations. Consistent with our primary hypothesis, activity in 
these regions was associated with correct trials when fame was goal-relevant and incorrect trials 
when famous faces were distractors.  
Working memory performance is modulated by stimulus familiarity  
 Our behavioural analyses were consistent with previous reports, as visual working 
memory was facilitated for famous/familiar faces when compared to anonymous/unfamiliar faces 
(Jackson & Raymond, 2008; Spreng et al., 2014).  Participants were significantly more accurate 
when matching famous, compared to anonymous, faces, across task demands. Reaction times 
were significantly faster for famous, compared to anonymous faces during our 3-back condition, 
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and approached statistical significance during our 1-back condition (see Figure 2). The 
facilitative effect of familiarity on accuracy, but not reaction time, was consistent across working 
memory conditions. The rapid stimulus presentation rate suggests that this facilitation may have 
occurred automatically as opposed to relying on conscious retrieval of long-term memory 
representations. Todorov, Gobbini, Evans, & Haxby (2007) investigated facial perception and 
spontaneous retrieval and found that minimal behavioural information, and poor explicit 
information about a face, is sufficient to elicit automatic mental representations. Jackson & 
Raymond (2008) reported that visual working memory for faces is enhanced if visual 
representations of the stimuli are accessible in long-term memory. Here, we included only those 
famous faces that were recognized by participants – confirming that participants had pre-existing 
knowledge of visual stimuli. Thus, our finding demonstrating that working memory was 
improved by fame is consistent with this earlier study and suggests that automatic access to 
stored representations is sufficient to enhance cognitive control processing.  
 Default network activity is modulated by stimulus familiarity during cognitive control 
  We investigated the pattern of activity that dissociated correct famous and correct 
anonymous face trials. For our 1-back condition, correct famous face trials engaged regions of 
the DN (e.g., MPFC, posterior IPL, PHG, HC, and PCC), whereas correct anonymous face trials 
engaged regions of the DAN (FEF, DLPFC & SPL) and FPCN (RLPFC, MFG & aINS; see 
Table 3). During our 3-back condition, correct famous face trials were associated with regions of 
the DN (vmPFC, portions of the lateral and medial temporal lobes), FPCN (dACC, MFG, 
RLPFC), and the DAN (DLPFC, inferior precentral sulcus, and visual area MT), whereas correct 
anonymous face trials were associated with a pattern of activity encompassing the FPCN 
(bilateral MFG & insula), and DAN (bilateral SPL) regions (see Table 4). Across working 
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memory demands, correct famous face trials recruited regions of the DN and accuracy for 
famous face trials was significantly higher in comparison to anonymous face matches. This 
suggests that DN activity may facilitate task performance. This is in contrast to previous studies 
suggesting that DN activity is associated with poor task performance (Raichle et al., 2011; 
Shulman et al., 1997; Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007). The DN was not active during correct 
anonymous face trials at any level of working memory demand. This is in-line with previous 
findings suggesting that the DN may facilitate working memory only when task demands are 
congruent with DN activity (Meyer et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2014). 
 Spreng et al., (2014) used a 2-back faces task and reported that correct famous face trials 
were associated with DN activity. While we observed a similar pattern for the 1-back working 
memory condition, during the more demanding 3-back condition, increased activity in the DAN 
and FPCN was observed. This suggests that as task difficulty increases, brain regions associated 
with attention and cognitive control are recruited. Jonides, Schumacher & Smith (1993) 
observed, during an n-back task, increases in activity in brain regions associated with attention as 
working memory load increased. Similarly, Meyer et al., (2012) observed increased activation in 
frontoparietal and DN areas as working memory load increased. Consistent with these previous 
reports, DN activity was also associated with positive performance for DN-congruent stimuli 
across both 1- and 3-back working memory conditions.  
In line with our hypothesis, when stimuli can access long-term stored representations, DN 
activity is associated with positive task performance. However, default network activity in 
isolation may be insufficient for correct task performance as the cognitive demands of the task 
increase. Increasing working memory demand is associated with greater activation in brain 
regions associated with attention (Jonides et al., 1993; Meyer et al., 2012). During our 1-back 
                           26 
 
trials, correct famous face trials were associated with DN activity. As working memory load 
increased, correct famous face trials were associated with DN, FPCN, and DAN activity. 
Previous studies that have reported that the DN is associated with poor performance have 
typically used stimuli devoid of personal meaning, such as blocks or shapes (Weissman et al., 
2006). In line with recent findings, we observed that DN activity was associated with positive 
task performance, but only when stimuli were personally relevant (Meyer et al., 2012; Spreng et 
al., 2010; Spreng et al., 2014).  
Default network interactions associated with cognitive control performance 
  The aim of this study was to extend previous research investigating DN contributions to 
cognitive control (Spreng et al., 2014) by manipulating both stimulus familiarity and working 
memory demands. By increasing task demands, we were able to investigate neural activity 
associated with correct, and importantly, incorrect, trials. Based on previous findings of DN 
interactions during cognitive control tasks involving personally meaningful stimuli (Spreng et 
al., 2010), we postulated that DN network coupling might modulate performance during working 
memory. We observed a pattern of neural activity that dissociated correct from incorrect famous 
face trials during our 3-back condition (see Table 7 and Figure 6). Correct famous face trials 
were associated with a pattern of activity encompassing regions of the FPCN, DAN, and DN. 
Incorrect famous face trials were associated with a pattern of activity encompassing the DN and 
FPCN. While correct and incorrect trials were both associated with regions of the DN, correct 
trials showed greater recruitment of DAN and FPCN regions. Correct famous face trials were 
associated with DN activity in the PCC, lateral and medial temporal lobes, and HC. In contrast, 
incorrect trials were associated with a more circumscribed DN pattern encompassing the PHC, 
PCC and MPFC (see Figure 6).  
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Previous studies investigating working memory for personally significant stimuli have 
found increases in activity within DN regions during correct trials (Meyer et al., 2012; Spreng et 
al., 2014).  In our study, DAN, DN, and FPCN activity were associated with correct working 
memory performance for famous stimuli. Co-activation of the DN and DAN during correct 
famous face trials is in contrast to previous studies reporting that the DN and DAN are anti-
correlated at rest, and during goal-directed tasks (Fox et al., 2005). Spreng et al. (2013) identified 
the dACC, MFG, aINS, and sMPFC as dual-aligned nodes within the FPCN that may flexibly 
couple with either the DAN or DN to support cognitive performance.  We observed activity 
within dACC and sMPFC regions during correct famous face trials, suggesting that dual-aligned 
nodes identified by Spreng et al. (2013) may support coupling of the FPCN with the DN and the 
DAN. We observed activity within the MFG, another dual-aligned node, and the DN during 
incorrect famous face trials. This suggests that during incorrect famous face trials the FPCN co-
activated with the DN, but not the DAN. Spreng et al., (2013) suggested dual-aligned nodes may 
allow attentional focus to shift from internally- to externally-directed cognition. During famous 
face trials, our task allows for associations between external perceptual features and internal 
stored representations to facilitate performance (i.e., recognition of famous faces). Correct 
performance during famous face trials may be facilitated by a shift from internal processes (i.e., 
recognition of famous faces, and recollection of prior knowledge), to an external focus (i.e., 
responding to the n-back task). Internal processes responsible for the facilitative effects of 
familiarity may be associated with activity within the DN, whereas external-attention processes 
essential for positive task performance are facilitated by the DAN. Our results support this 
process as being mediated by the FPCN (Spreng et al., 2013). Failure of the FPCN to couple with 
the DN to facilitate internal stored representations may reduce the facilitative effects of 
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familiarity, whereas failure to couple with the DAN, and shift attention externally, may result in 
poor performance. Indeed, there is an absence of DAN activity during incorrect famous face 
trials. Poor performance during famous face trials may be explained by a failure to shift focus 
externally, evidenced by an absence of DAN activity.  
Previous studies suggest that the DN facilitates cognitive performance when stimuli 
access stored representations, and impairs performance when stimuli are devoid of personal 
meaning (Weissman et al., 2006; Spreng et al., 2014). During correct anonymous face trials, 
there was an absence of DN activity. We observed FPCN and DAN activity during correct, in 
contrast to incorrect, anonymous face trials. This is in line with previous studies reporting correct 
performance for unfamiliar stimuli being associated with activity within attentional networks, but 
not the DN (Weissman et al., 2006; Spreng et al., 2014). Similar to correct famous face trials, we 
observed activity within dual-aligned nodes of the FPCN, the MFG and dACC, in addition to 
DAN activity during correct anonymous face trials. Our results suggests coupling of the DAN 
and FPCN through the MFG and dACC during correct anonymous face trials (Spreng et al., 
2013). Incorrect anonymous face trials were associated with partial recruitment of the DN, 
FPCN, and DAN. Absence of core DN nodes, such as the MPFC or PCC, typically associated 
with mind wandering (McGuire et al., 1996; Smallwood et al., 2011), and the presence of regions 
associated with attention, suggests incorrect performance on anonymous face trials was not due 
to mind wandering. While famous face trials allow for associations between external perceptual 
features and internal stored representations to facilitate performance, during anonymous face 
trials, famous faces serve as distractors. Default network areas recruited during incorrect 
anonymous face trials overlap with regions associated with the episodic aspects of the DN, such 
as episodic retrieval (e.g., the right lateral temporal lobe and AG; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; 
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Rugg & Vilberg, 2013). This suggests that participants may have spontaneously engaged stored 
representations of famous faces (Todorov et al., 2007), impairing performance. During incorrect 
anonymous face trials, participants were attending to anonymous faces (exemplified by DAN 
activity), but were distracted by famous faces (exemplified by DN activity). Additionally, a 
reduction in FPCN activity suggests participants failed to fully engage, or couple, with the 
appropriate network during incorrect anonymous face trials (i.e., the DAN).  
 Previous studies have reported that the FPCN, coupled with the DN, is associated with 
positive task performance during a personally relevant (i.e., autobiographical) problem solving 
task (Spreng et al., 2010). In this study, we observed that co-activation of the FPCN with the DN 
and DAN is associated with positive task performance for famous face stimuli during a 
demanding working memory task. During a demanding working memory task, co-activation of 
the FPCN with only the DN was associated with poor task performance during famous face 
trials. This suggests that as working memory demands increase, co-activation of the FPCN with 
the DN, in isolation from the DAN, is insufficient for positive task performance when stimuli 
evoke stored representations (Todorov et al., 2007).  Our findings are line with previous studies 
implicating the DAN and DN during working memory performance for stimuli that access stored 
representations (Meyer et al., 2012).  When stimuli are devoid of personal meaning, activity 
within regions of the DAN and FPCN is associated with positive task performance.  Incorrect 
anonymous face trials were associated with partial recruitment of the DN, DAN, and FPCN.  
Default network areas recruited during incorrect anonymous face trials overlap with 
regions associated with the medial temporal lobe regions in the DN that are associated with 
mnemonic and associative processing (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). Engagement of these 
regions by famous face stimuli may facilitate or impair performance depending on trial type. 
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That is, when famous faces serve as targets, stored representations may facilitate performance, 
when famous faces serve as distractors, stored representations may impair performance. 
Additionally, reduction in FPCN activity during incorrect anonymous face trials suggests 
participants failed to fully couple with the appropriate network (i.e., the DAN). Our results 
suggest network interactions may serve as an explanatory mechanism for correct, and incorrect 
trials. Importantly, co-activation of the FPCN with the DN and DAN supports working memory 
performance only when stimuli access stored representations. When stimuli are devoid of 
personal meaning, positive task performance is associated with activity within the FPCN and 
DAN.  
Recruitment of DN subsystems during controlled processing  
Incorrect famous, and anonymous face trials were associated with activity within the DN 
and FPCN. Our analysis revealed a distinct pattern of DN subsystem activity for each condition. 
Incorrect anonymous face trials recruited regions that overlapped with the DN medial temporal 
subsystem, a system associated with the episodic features of the DN (i.e., mental simulation, 
imagination, episodic recollection and contextual retrieval; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). 
Activity within nodes of the DN during incorrect famous face trials overlapped with the core 
subsystem of the DN, a system associated with social monitoring, judgments, and self-generated 
thought tasks (Binder et al., 2009; Brewer, Garrison, & Whitfield-Gabrieli, 2013; Qin & 
Northoff, 2011). Activity within the medial temporal subsystem during incorrect anonymous 
face trials suggests participants were engaging in episodic processes associated with the DN 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). As famous faces are distracting during anonymous face trials, 
participants may have been engaging stored representations of famous faces.  In our analysis of 
correct and incorrect famous face trials, correct trials were associated with DN activity 
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overlapping with regions of the medial temporal subsystem. When famous faces were congruent 
with task demands (i.e., famous face trials), DN medial temporal subsystem activity facilitated 
task performance. When famous faces were incongruent with task demands (i.e., anonymous 
face trials) recollection of stored representations, which elicited medial temporal subsystem 
activity, served to distract participants, leading to errors.  
Activity within the core subsystem during incorrect famous face trials may suggest 
participants were distracted or engaged in internal processes such as mind-wandering, or day 
dreaming (McGuire et al., 1996; Smallwood et al., 2011). Alternatively, by failing to engage 
nodes of the DN associated with the episodic features of the DN, participants may not have 
spontaneously retrieved stored representations of targets (i.e., famous faces). Todorov et al., 
(2007) found that when participants could recall information about familiar faces (recalled 
familiar faces), versus when participants failed to retrieve information about a familiar face 
(unrecalled familiar face), perceptions of recalled familiar faces were associated with more 
activity in lateral and medial temporal lobe regions – areas overlapping with the medial temporal 
subsystem. Absence of medial temporal subsystem activity suggests that during incorrect famous 
face trials participants failed to retrieve stored representations of famous face stimuli. By failing 
to retrieve stored representations, targets may have been perceived as unfamiliar faces. 
Perception of familiar faces as unfamiliar would diminish the facilitative effects of familiarity on 
cognitive performance (Jackson & Raymond, 2008), explaining errors on famous face trials. 
Our results suggest that in both conditions different subsystems of the DN are coupled 
with the FPCN, providing evidence for distinct roles of DN subsystems during controlled 
processing (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). The role of each subsystem may be mediated by task 
demands. Core subsystem activity during incorrect famous face trials may be associated with 
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mind wandering (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 1996; Smallwood et al., 2011).  
Indeed, previous research suggests inefficient processing of stimuli is associated with activity in 
regions of the DN overlapping with some regions of the core subsystem (Weissman et al., 2006). 
We observed that co-activation of the DN with the FPCN facilitates task performance for famous 
face stimuli. Division of the DN into subsystems elucidates the relationship between the DN and 
the FPCN during controlled processing. When recall of stored representations can facilitate 
performance, as is the case during famous face trials, correct famous face trials are associated 
with coupling of the FPCN with the medial temporal subsystem. Failure to engage the medial 
temporal subsystem may impair performance when engagement of stored representations can 
facilitate performance, evidenced during incorrect famous face trials. When the recall of stored 
representations may serve to distract, as is the case during anonymous face trials, incorrect 
anonymous face trials are associated with activity within the medial temporal subsystem.  While 
past studies have found that the DN is associated with positive (Meyer et al., 2012: Spreng et al., 
2010; Spreng et al., 2014) or negative (Weissman et al., 2006) task performance, our results 
suggests that specific subsystems of the DN can facilitate (i.e., the medial temporal subsystem) 
or impair (i.e., the core subsystem) task performance depending on task goals. The association 
between the medial temporal subsystem and positive task performance is reliant on task 
demands. Coupling of the medial temporal subsystem of the FPCN can facilitate task 
performance, but only when targets access stored representations. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
A potential limitation of the study relates to our interpretation of our famous face 1-back 
trials. During our 1-back correct famous face trials, compared to our anonymous face trials, we 
observed DN activity. Interpretation of our 1-back famous face trials may be confounded by 
stimuli properties because famous faces naturally elicit DN activity (Leveroni et al., 2000).  It is 
important, however, to consider that this pattern of neural activity arises in the context of a 
continuous working memory performance task. That is, activation of this network is associated 
with poor performance during externally-directed cognitive tasks (Weissman et al., 2006). Given 
that our 3-back famous face trials were associated with DN activity, matched for stimulus type 
(i.e., AFFA vs. FAAF), and consistent with previous results (Spreng et al., 2014), it is unlikely 
that the DN activation observed during our 1-back is only due to the perception of famous face 
stimuli. Another limitation of our study is the number of trials used for analysis per participant. 
In this study, with the exception of match trials, we never repeated an anonymous or famous 
face. We removed trials where participants did not recognize a famous face. We excluded these 
trials to ensure we accurately manipulated familiarity. Including unrecognized famous faces 
limits the scope of our interpretations. That is, we cannot accurately interpret familiar stimuli as 
modulating network activity if we include unrecognized familiar stimuli in our analysis. By 
removing trials we excluded approximately 50% of our famous face trials, on average, during 
our 3-back task. This is a potential limitation when interpreting the results of our famous and 
anonymous face analysis. Indeed, our anonymous face hit and miss contrasts revealed expected 
activity for hits, but not for misses. Our anonymous face misses were not associated with 
widespread DN activity, typically seen in previous studies (Weissman et al., 2006). This may be 
due to limited statistical power given the imperative to include only recognized famous stimuli.  
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Last, we did not directly control for degree of familiarity in this study. That is, some 
famous faces may have been more familiar than others. In our study, we manipulated task 
difficulty across two stimulus types: famous, and anonymous faces. We observed that familiarity 
can enhance task performance, and is associated with DN activity. It is unclear if task 
performance, and DN activity, is modulated by level of familiarity during a demanding cognitive 
task. Familiarity has been shown to modulate activity in regions of the DN in a recognition task, 
with more familiar faces associated with greater activation in the anterior paracingulate cortex, 
and posterior superior temporal sulcus (Gobbini & Haxby, 2007). One hypothesis is that 
increases in familiarity might coincide with parametric increases in activity in DN regions during 
a working memory task. Future studies should investigate the effect of multiple levels of 
familiarity on modulating DN activity during a cognitive task.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the role of the DN during externally-directed 
cognitive control. We built upon previous research suggesting activation of the DN during 
working memory can facilitate task performance by manipulating working memory difficulty 
and analyzing both correct and incorrect trials (Spreng et al., 2014). Across working memory 
demands, activity within the DN was associated with positive task performance when target 
stimuli were able to access stored representations. Further, accuracy was significantly higher for 
famous versus anonymous face trials. This suggests that when stimuli automatically or 
spontaneously accessed long-term stored representations (Todorov et al., 2007), the DN may 
facilitate controlled processing. Previous studies have found that, as working memory load 
increases, activation in brain regions associated with attention concurrently increase (Jonides et 
al., 1993; Meyer et al., 2012). In our study, as working memory demands increased, we observed 
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recruitment of attention networks (i.e., FPCN and DAN) during famous and anonymous face 
trials. Importantly, when stimuli activated stored representations (i.e., famous faces), engagement 
of the DN, in addition to attentional networks, was associated with positive task performance.  
We further postulated that coupling may serve as a neural mechanism supporting the role 
of the DN during controlled processing. Coupling of the FPCN with the DN, or DAN, to 
facilitate task performance has been demonstrated in previous research (Spreng et al., 2010). 
Spreng et al., (2013) identified nodes within the FPCN that may flexibly couple with the DAN or 
DN to support goal-directed cognition.  We observed co-activation of dual-aligned nodes 
(Spreng et al., 2013) with DN and DAN activity during correct famous, and anonymous face 
trials. Activation of dual-aligned nodes with DN and DAN activity supports the idea of coupling 
as an underlying mechanism facilitating controlled processing. Recruitment of regions of the 
DAN, in conjunction with FPCN and DN during a continuous performance task is a novel 
finding. We suggest that as cognitive demand on an externally-directed task involving familiar 
stimuli increases, co-activation of the DAN and DN, supported through dual-aligned nodes of the 
FPCN, is necessary for positive task performance.  
A core rationale of our study was to investigate the relationship between DN activation 
and cognitive control by contrasting brain activity during correct and incorrect trials. Our 
analysis revealed a distinct pattern of DN subsystem activity during incorrect trials for famous 
and anonymous faces. Correct famous, and incorrect anonymous, face trials recruited regions of 
the medial temporal subsystem, a system associated with the episodic processes of the DN 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). Incorrect famous face trials recruited regions of the core 
subsystem, a system associated with mind wandering, and daydreaming (McGuire et al., 1996; 
Smallwood et al., 2011). Our results suggest that distinct subsystems of the DN may support, or 
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impair cognitive performance. As observed during our incorrect famous face trials, core 
subsystem activity in isolation from medial temporal subsystem activity may be insufficient to 
support controlled processing when stimuli access stored representations. When famous face 
stimuli served as targets, activation of the medial temporal subsystem activity was necessary for 
accurate performance. In contrast, when famous face stimuli served as distractors, medial 
temporal subsystem activity was associated with poor task performance, suggesting that the DN 
can support externally-directed cognitive control, but only when task demands are congruent 
with DN functions.   
Consistent with our overall hypothesis, when stimuli automatically, or spontaneously, 
access long-term stored representations, as is the case in famous face matches, DN activity 
facilitates task performance. As task demands increase, recruitment of attention and cognitive 
control networks is necessary for correct performance on famous, and anonymous face trials. We 
predicted that DN activity would be associated with correct performance when stimuli accessed 
stored representations. Our results, however, suggests that different subsystems of the DN may 
be associated with differing task performance (i.e., correct, and incorrect trials), across task 
demands. We provided evidence suggesting that coupling may serve as a mechanism supporting 
the role of DN during controlled processing. Our results support the importance of DN activation 
and interactions with other brain networks to support externally-directed cognitive control. These 
results demonstrate that the DN is not simply a “task negative” network. The DN, FPCN, and 
DAN interact to facilitate controlled processing. Both the nature of the stimuli and task demands 
determine the extent and impact of DN engagement during externally-directed cognitive control.  
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Table 1. Peak activation coordinates for rest and sustained task performance (n-back) 
  Coordinates  
Lat Region x y z BSR 
Rest < Faces n-back     
B Medial PFC 0 40 -4 7.74 
L Superior Frontal Gyrus -20 40 32 4.95 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus -44 -36 -2 3.93 
L Premotor Cortex -18 12 52 3.59 
R Primary Motor Cortex 46 -16 48 4.97 
 Posterior Insula -38 -16 -6 4.86 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -66 -32 32 5.26 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 66 -24 30 5.87 
B Superior Parietal Lobule 16 -56 68 7.06 
B Posterior Cingulate -14 -40 40 5.71 
B Visual Association Cortex -12 -82 28 10.91 
  54 -70 24 4.02 
  -58 -58 -14 3.28 
L Cerebellum -20 -40 -32 4.95 
R Cerebellum 8 -56 -58 4.54 
Faces n-back > Rest     
R Frontal Pole 2 62 -22 -4.70 
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 30 46 -18 -3.99 
L Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex -36 58 10 -5.61 
R  20 58 32 -3.33 
R  14 68 18 -3.12 
R Frontal Eye Fields 36 12 52 -7.48 
L  -32 2 52 -4.57 
B Anterior Cingulate 2 22 42 -10.03 
R Primary Motor Cortex 12 -38 66 -3.80 
R Anterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
50 -46 52 -7.25 
L Anterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
-58 -52 26 -3.36 
L Anterior Temporal Lobe -42 -10 -42 -3.83 
L Posterior Superior Temporal 
Sulcus 
-50 -54 6 -4.61 
R Fusiform Gyrus 44 -60 -18 -5.92 
L Fusiform Gyrus -44 -62 -26 -10.55 
 
Note. See Figure 2 for rest and sustained working memory performance brain activation maps 
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Table 2. Peak activation coordinates for viewing the first instance of famous and anonymous 
faces 
  Coordinates  
Lat Region x y z BSR 
Famous > Anonymous     
R Orbitofrontal Cortex 34 36 -18 6.57 
L Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex -8 46 -22 4.93 
R Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex 16 56 -14 4.27 
R Medial Frontal gyrus 16 54 4 4.40 
  16 38 36 5.66 
R Anterior Prefrontal Cortex 12 72 -9 3.82 
L Anterior Prefrontal Cortex -16 56 2 4.27 
L Premotor Cortex -38 -2 42 3.22 
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -38 24 10 5.41 
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 42 10 30 3.99 
R Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 46 32 10 5.04 
L Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex -16 28 46 5.54 
  -16 44 42 3.89 
L Superior Parietal Lobule -36 -66 56 3.74 
R Posterior Inferior parietal 
Lobule 
44 -58 22 4.08 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus -52 -14 -18 5.27 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 60 0 -30 3.16 
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 36 -10 -42 3.21 
L Posterior Cingulate Cortex -10 -54 18 6.17 
  -2 -32 38 4.65 
R Basal Ganglia 20 8 24 4.84 
R Thalamus 4 -16 2 5.31 
  4 6 -10 5.18 
L Fusiform Gyrus -30 -52 -12 4.48 
R Fusiform Gyrus 38 -52 4 3.62 
R Visual Association Cortex 36 -70 14 3.00 
L Visual Association Cortex -42 -80 6 5.37 
R Associative Visual Cortex 48 -78 -2 4.80 
R Cerebellum 38 -40 -28 4.15 
Anonymous > Famous     
L Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex -36 36 24 -5.33 
R Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 46 44 14 -4.65 
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -54 6 12 -3.77 
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44 44 -2 -3.33 
B Dorsal Anterior Cingulate 0 6 30 -6.60 
      
R Premotor Cortex 2 -12 64 -6.23 
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R Premotor Cortex 56 6 28 -5.62 
R Premotor Cortex 18 6 56 -3.58 
L Premotor Cortex -24 -6 52 -3.93 
L Premotor Cortex -56 6 30 -4.54 
L Anterior Insula -28 18 -10 -4.98 
R Anterior Insula 40 12 -6 -4.12 
L Posterior Insula -34 -12 -4 -3.51 
R Posterior Insula 46 0 4 -3.42 
R Anterior Caudate 14 18 -8 -4.39 
L Putamen -18 16 -8 -3.88 
  -22 4 -14 -3.75 
R Anterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
40 -38 44 -3.33 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 34 -46 64 -3.92 
R Primary Sensory Cortex 58 -12 30 -5.55 
R Somatosensory Association 
Cortex 
9 -36 52 -4.28 
L Precuneus -6 -52 54 -4.68 
  -14 -64 42 -3.82 
L Temporo-parietal Junction -62 -12 16 -3.54 
L Superior Temporal Gyrus -62 -8 6 -3.35 
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 44 -4 -14 -3.16 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 60 -22 -6 -4.18 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 50 -29 -16 -3.72 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 48 -46 -5 -4.65 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus -56 -34 14 -6.80 
L Ventral Posterior Cingulate -12 -28 34 -3.84 
L Primary Visual Cortex -10 -88 0 -3.06 
L Visual Area MT -52 -64 4 -4.65 
L Visual Association Cortex -2 -100 -2 -4.63 
R Visual Association Cortex 8 -82 26 -4.44 
R Visual Association Cortex -14 -66 -10 -3.64 
R Cerebellum 22 -60 -40 -4.13 
R Cerebellum 14 -60 -26 -4.07 
R Cerebellum 32 -18 66 -3.66 
R Cerebellum 12 -66 -50 -3.67 
R Cerebellum 28 -54 -34 -3.97 
R Cerebellum 2 -74 -46 -3.79 
Note. See Figure 3 for brain activation maps corresponding to the first instance of viewing a 
famous, and anonymous face 
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Table 3. Peak activation coordinates for correct famous (FF) and anonymous (AA) face 1-back 
trials 
  Coordinates  
Lat Region X y z BSR 
FF > AA     
R Medial Prefrontal Cortex 8 72 8 -3.62 
L Superior Medial Prefrontal 
Cortex 
-10 64 22 -3.37 
L Dorsal Anterior Cingulate -16 42 14 -4.89 
L Posterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
-48 -70 32 -2.93 
L Parahippocampal Cortex -28 -40 -16 -4.23 
R Parahippocampal Cortex 18 -30 -20 -3.11 
L Hippocampus -24 -22 -4 -5.17 
R Temporoparietal Junction 36 -48 2 -4.01 
R Posterior Cingulate 6 -48 20 -3.34 
R Putamen 22 0 24 -4.86 
L Putamen -24 -2 30 -3.37 
L Brainstem -4 -16 -8 -3.03 
L Cerebellum -14 -38 -34 -3.73 
AA > FF     
R Anterior PFC 28 46 12 3.23 
L Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex -44 34 34 3.69 
  -48 10 38 3.59 
R Frontal Eye Fields 28 -12 48 6.75 
R Middle Frontal gyrus 42 38 14 4.00 
L Premotor Area -12 -24 48 3.17 
R Supplementary Motor Area 2 6 46 5.52 
L Supplementary Motor Area -6 -4 68 3.35 
L Anterior Insula -26 24 -4 5.91 
R Anterior Insula 34 18 -2 6.01 
R Insula 32 -26 22 3.70 
L Insula -30 -26 8 3.52 
R Thalamus 10 -24 4 6.00 
L Premotor Cortex -54 0 46 3.86 
L Superior Temporal Lobe -52 -22 0 4.90 
R Superior Temporal Lobe 64 -16 -6 4.00 
R Posterior Inferior lateral 
Temporal lobe 
60 -36 -20 3.18 
L Posterior Superior Temporal 
Sulcus 
-50 -54 6 6.48 
R Posterior Superior Temporal 
Sulcus 
60 -50 -2 4.95 
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R Striatum 14 -14 -12 3.68 
L Somatosensory Cortex -22 -18 72 4.86 
  -12 -46 64 3.37 
R Supramarginal gyrus 36 -50 30 3.37 
L Superior Parietal Lobule -38 -42 54 7.25 
R Anterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
50 -34 48 5.25 
R TPJ 66 -40 30 3.62 
L Precuneus -2 -36 50 3.01 
R Retrosplenial Cortex 14 -62 10 2.98 
L Cuneus 0 -68 12 3.65 
R Posterior Occipital Lobe 22 -94 0 4.64 
  18 -84 -14 3.43 
L Posterior Occipital Lobe -32 -76 10 3.31 
L Lateral Occipital lobe -44 -88 -2 3.64 
R Fusiform Gyrus 44 -48 -10 4.92 
R Striatum 16 14 -8 5.06 
L Amygdala -24 -12 -6 3.77 
L Cerebellum -4 -80 -40 4.07 
  -2 -60 -18 4.03 
  -30 -74 -28 3.91 
  -48 -60 -26 3.47 
  -18 -74 -48 4.78 
  -22 -48 -52 3.82 
R Cerebellum 6 -46 -60 3.35 
  26 -64 -52 5.32 
Note. See Figure 4 for correct 1-back famous and anonymous face trial brain activation maps 
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Table 4. Peak activation coordinates for correct famous (FAAF) and anonymous (AFFA) face 
3-back trials 
  Coordinates  
Lat Region X y z BSR 
FAAF > AFFA     
B Ventromedial PFC 0 46 -24 3.21 
L Rostral-lateral PFC -26 68 10 3.55 
R Dorsolateral PFC 44 26 20 5.23 
L Dorsolateral PFC -42 50 12 4.41 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus -22 40 12 4/51 
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -56 24 18 4.07 
L Inferior Precentral Sulcus -36 4 34 3.45 
L Dorsal Anterior Cingulate -12 14 36 5.83 
R Superior Temporal Sulcus 36 -62 26 4.03 
R Temporal Sulcus 64 -54 10 3.00 
L Parahippocampal Cortex -54 -40 -10 3.81 
R Medial Temporal Lobe 30 0 -36 3.77 
R Parahippocampal Gyrus 38 -26 -22 3.06                                                                    
L Lateral Temporal Lobe -66 -18 2 4.33 
R Temporoparietal Junction 54 -44 26 3.20 
  54 -56 10 2.96 
R Amygdala 24 -6 -20 2.98 
R Visual Area MT  42 -56 6 3.17 
L Visual Area MT -46 -82 6 3.13 
L Putamen -28 0 16 3.67 
R Thalamus 4 -6 14 3.30 
L Thalamus -16 -14 12 3.18 
L Fusiform Gyrus -42 -60 -22 6.55 
R Fusiform Gyrus 40 -52 -26 5.20 
R Posterior Occipital Lobe 32 -94 2 5.26 
  10 -98 0 3.67 
L Cerebellum -2 -48 -38 5.02 
R  2 -80 -26 3.64 
AFFA > FAAF     
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 26 58 12 -4.99 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus -18 14 54 -3.56 
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -48 18 4 -3.38 
R Premotor Area 30 -18 58 -3.72 
L Premotor Area -18 -8 66 -3.22 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 28 -32 64 -3.85 
L Superior Parietal Lobule -26 -38 64 -3.60 
R Sensorimotor Cortex 16 -6 56 -4.43 
L Posterior Superior Temporal -50 -26 12 -3.81 
                           57 
 
Gyrus 
R Posterior Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
38 -38 10 -3.76 
R Thalamus 22 -20 -2 -4.32 
R Hypothalamus 10 -8 -6 -3.80 
L Insula -34 -2 -4 -4.15 
L Cerebellum -10 -58 -62 -3.38 
R Cerebellum 36 -46 -54 -3.72 
 Cerebellum 14 -54 -54 -4.29 
 Cerebellum 28 -58 -58 -4.80 
Note. See Figure 5 for correct 3-back famous and anonymous face trial brain activation maps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Peak activation coordinates for famous face hit, and miss 3-back trials 
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  Coordinates  
Lat Region x y z BSR 
Hits > Misses     
L Dorsal Medial Prefrontal Cortex -8 66 18 3.44 
R Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 52 40 16 3.13 
L Supplementary Motor Area -8 -12 56 6.45 
  -8 -18 74 4.09 
  -12 18 66 4.09 
L Primary Motor Cortex -32 -24 70 5.27 
R Primary Motor Cortex 36 4 34 5.22 
  28 -14 68 3.47 
L Premotor Area -60 4 30 4.16 
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -60 8 18 3.24 
R Premotor Area 36 -4 62 3.68 
L Anterior Cingulate -8 16 36 5.16 
R Insula 40 2 -12 3.48 
L Striatum -14 16 -8 4.63 
R Thalamus  6 -12 8 3.36 
R Anterior Hippocampus 36 12 -24 5.17 
L Hippocampus -20 -20 -24 4.46 
R Superior Temporal Sulcus 66 -44 6 4.57 
R Lateral Temporal Cortex 62 2 -6 3.93 
  62 -28 6 3.54 
  64 -12 6 3.38 
L Lateral Temporal Cortex -62 -14 -8 4.82 
  -58 -34 16 2.97 
  -52 2 -6.0 4.75 
  -58 -34 16 2.97 
R Medial Temporal Cortex 38 -14 -36 4.33 
L Medial Temporal Cortex -58 -48 4 3.81 
R Temporo-parietal Junction 52 -44 22 3.67 
L Dorsal Posterior Cingulate -4 -26 46 3.97 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 24 -74 56 3.42 
R Somatosensory Cortex 48 -22 38 3.60 
R Intraparietal Sulcus 36 -62 34 3.74 
L Intraparietal Sulcus -32 -58 44 3.18 
L Intraparietal Sulcus -26 -72 30 3.00 
R Lingual Gyrus 20 -54 0 5.16 
L Fusiform Gyrus -38 -66 -20 8.57 
R Fusiform Gyrus 44 -66 -18 6.08 
R Visual Association Area 2 -80 30 3.43 
R Medial Occipital Cortex 12 -70 12 3.44 
B Ventromedial Occipital Cortex 0 -84 -14 3.38 
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R Cerebellum 4 -74 -32 3.20 
L Cerebellum -28 -68 -58 3.37 
  -14 -38 -46 3.96 
L Brainstem -2 -30 -44 4.43 
Misses > Hits     
L Middle Frontal Gyrus -24 24 40 -3.54 
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 18 24 50 -3.54 
R Medial Prefrontal Cortex 12 48 4 -3.47 
L Medial Prefrontal Cortex -16 58 -2 -3.47 
R Anterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule  
58 -40 48 -3.04 
R Dorsal Posterior Cingulate 8 -34 44 -3.74 
L Parahippocampal Cortex -38 -52 -4 -4.00 
Note. See Figure 6 for 3-back correct and incorrect, famous face trial brain activation maps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Peak activation coordinates for anonymous face hit, and miss 3-back trials 
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  Coordinates  
Lat Region x y z BSR 
Hits > Misses     
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 34 2 36 -3.79 
R Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 30 50 4 -3.76 
L Inferior Frontal Gyrus -52 22 -8 -5.39 
L Frontal Eye Fields -24 -2 48 -4.11 
B Primary Motor Cortex 0 0 68 -3.96 
B Supplementary Motor Area 0 10 54 -3.11 
L Anterior Cingulate -6 26 38 -4.47 
R Anterior Insula 32 18 2 -4.22 
L Anterior Insula -32 18 -4 -4.26 
R Putamen -18 0 4 -4.02 
R Striatum 14 12 -8 -4.08 
R Superior Temporal Sulcus 52 -34 2 -4.51 
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus -52 -60 -18 -2.73 
  -66 -46 0 -2.90 
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 58 -40 -18 3.67 
R Anterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
52 -34 44 -4.39 
R Intraparietal Sulcus 34 -42 42 -5.25 
L Intraparietal Sulcus -30 -58 50 -4.84 
R Fusiform Gyrus 48 -64 -18 -4.08 
R Posterior Occipital Cortex 32 -92 -18 -4.06 
L Brainstem -10 -18 -14 -3.84 
L Cerebellum -12 -76 -28 -3.4 
  -38 -50 -36 -3.62 
R Cerebellum 40 -60 -38 -4.73 
  38 -56 -60 -4.10 
  16 -38 -36 -3.62 
  14 -56 -30 -3.04 
Misses > Hits     
R Premotor Cortex 40 -14 36 3.61 
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 60 14 14 3.28 
L Supplementary Motor Area -16 -10 58 4.21 
L Cingulate Gyrus -14 -24 32 4.34 
R Angular Gyrus 40 -68 26 3.32 
R Lateral Temporal Cortex 54 -2 -28 4.05 
R Middle Temporal Gyrus 34 -56 16 4.43 
R Supramarginal Gyrus 50 -16 22 3.91 
L Supramarginal Gyrus -48 -18 26 4.39 
  -42 -34 24 3.64 
L Supramarginal Gyrus -66 -22 32 3.56 
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R Somatosensory Cortex 2 -32 68 3.01 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 18 -48 72 3.53 
R Temporo-parietal Junction 48 -42 28 4.05 
L Visual Area MT -34 -76 24 4.85 
R Precuneus 6 -44 62 3.62 
L Precuneus -2 -68 28 3.62 
R Brainstem 6 -34 -22 3.55 
L Cerebellum -34 -80 -40 3.66 
Note. See Figure 6 for 3-back correct and incorrect, anonymous face trial brain activation maps 
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Table 7. Peak activation coordinates for incorrect famous (FAAF) and anonymous (AFFA) 
face 3-back trials 
  Coordinates  
Lat Region x y z BSR 
FAAF > AFFA     
R Medial Prefrontal Cortex 14 50 4 -3.93 
L Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex -4 50 40 -4.20 
R Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex 40 -50 28 -3.23 
L Frontal Eye Fields  -26 24 42 -3.87 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus  36 12 36 -3.36 
L Precuneus -12 -56 48 -3.91 
R Anterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
54 -36 42 3.49 
R Posterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
50 -58 42 -3.41 
L Posterior Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
-44 -56 46 -3.87 
R Posterior Cingulate Cortex 8 -34 40 -3.24 
R Basal Ganglia 16 2 2 -3.29 
L Cerebellum -26 -78 -50 -3.50 
AFFA > FAAF     
L Supplementary Motor Area -22 -16 58 5.56 
L Premotor Cortex -60 4 30 3.32 
R Premotor Cortex 62 4 32 4.36 
  54 -4 48 3.58 
R Anterior Cingulate 10 8 38 4.98 
B Anterior Cingulate 0 30 22 3.52 
R Insula 50 -16 22 6.52 
L Posterior Insula -42 0 6 3.47 
R Posterior Insula 42 -2 -8 3.30 
L Caudate -16 28 4 3.50 
L Temporoparietal Junction -44 -24 12 5.03 
R Hippocampus 26 -26 -16 4.26 
  24 -48 0 4.13 
  14 -32 8 3.86 
  34 -8 -26 3.51 
  20 -12 -26 3.49 
R Superior Temporal Cortex 68 -28 0 5.44 
  58 -40 22 5.19 
  60 -24 -16 3.47 
  -52 0 -6 5.14 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 8 -38 70 5.33 
L Anterior Inferior Parietal -44 -28 38 3.45 
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Lobule 
R Cuneus 6 -84 28 3.93 
R Precuneus 24 -58 20 5.05 
L Posterior Cingulate -8 -18 42 3.46 
R Ventral Posterior Cingulate 16 -76 16 3.04 
L Fusiform Gyrus -38 -82 -20 3.48 
R Retrosplenial Cortex 46 -70 26 3.03 
L Visual Association Area -16 -104 -4 3.51 
R Visual Cortex 10 -86 -6 4.29 
  28 -82 8 3.70 
  14 -90 12 3.44 
B Periaqueductal Grey -2 -30 -6 3.70 
R Cerebellum 26 -46 -34 4.86 
  44 -44 -32 3.62 
  10 -54 -8 3.23 
L Cerebellum -20 -68 -32 4.13 
  -44 -70 -24 3.69 
  -4 -62 -6 3.75 
  -38 -42 -36 3.85 
  -12 -34 -36 3.87 
Note. See Figure 5 for 3-back famous and anonymous face trial brain activation maps 
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Figure 1. Time series of the (A) 1-back and (B) 3-back working memory task.  
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Figure 2. Univariate statistics for the 1- and 3-back task for (A) accuracy (FF vs. AA: t(24) = 
4.83, p < .001), FAAF vs. AFFA t(24) = 3.05, p = .005) and (B) reaction time (FAAF vs. AFFA: 
t(24) = 3.97, p < .001). 
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Figure 3. Transient and sustained brain activity dissociating rest (warm colour) and n-back (cold 
colour) conditions. Brain activity corresponds to bootstrap ratio values, the ratio of voxel 
salience to the bootstrapped standard error. See Table 1 for peak activation coordinates. 
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Figure 4. Transient brain activity dissociating the first instance of a famous (warm colours) and 
anonymous (cold colours) face. Brain activity corresponds to bootstrap ratio values, the ratio of 
voxel salience to the bootstrapped standard error. See Table 2 for peak activation coordinates. 
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Figure 5. Transient brain activity dissociating 1-back anonymous (warm colours) and famous 
(cold colour) matches. Brain activity corresponds to bootstrap ratio values, the ratio of voxel 
salience to the bootstrapped standard error. See Table 3 for peak activation coordinates.  
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Figure 6. Transient brain activity dissociating 3-back famous and anonymous trials. (A) 
Transient brain activity dissociating famous (warm colour) and anonymous (cold colour) hits. 
See Table 4 for peak activation coordinates. (B) Transient brain activity dissociating famous 
(warm colour) and anonymous (cold colour) misses. See Table 7 for peak activation coordinates. 
Brain activity corresponds to bootstrap ratio values, the ratio of voxel salience to the 
bootstrapped standard error. 
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Figure 7. Transient brain activity for famous and anonymous face 3-back trials.  (A) Transient 
brain activity dissociating famous hits (warm colours) and misses (cold colours). See Table 5 for 
peak activation coordinates. (B) Transient brain activity dissociating anonymous hits (warm 
colours) and misses (cold colours). See Table 6 for peak activation coordinates. Brain activity 
corresponds to bootstrap ratio values, the ratio of voxel salience to the bootstrapped standard 
error. 
